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Abstract
The existing literature on credence goods and expert services has overlooked the
importance of risk aversion. In this paper we extend a standard expert model of
credence goods with verifiable service quality by considering risk-averse consumers.
Our results show that the presence of risk aversion reduces the expert’s incentive to
invest in diagnosis and may thus lead to consumers’ mistreatment.
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1 Introduction
In a number of activities, one agent’s expertise substantially reduces the risk incurred
by another agent. For instance, in agriculture, experts provide advice on the right use
of pesticides, which dramatically lowers the output risk. In health care, medical doctors
diagnose illnesses and prescribe the appropriate treatment. For legal services, the lawyer
suggests the best strategy to win the trial. As a result, the customer’s risk aversion is
likely to play a crucial role in the expert’s incentives to acquire information on the most
efficient treatment. At the same time, expertise has a credence good dimension (see Darby
and Karni, 1973 or Emons, 1997) since the information collected by the expert is usually
not observed by the agent. The agent’s risk-aversion could therefore also cause the expert
not to conduct a thorough diagnosis, and instead to propose useless but risk-free costly
treatment.
In this paper we examine theoretically the impact of risk aversion on the expert’s
incentives to collect information in order to avoid either overtreatment or undertreatment
in a credence good context with verifiable service quality.
For that purpose, we develop a simple model of an expert-customer relationship with
risk-averse consumers, inspired by Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and (2009). We show
that in a credence good context, risk aversion reduces rather than increases the incentives
of the expert to exert effort to provide the right treatment.
Our starting point is the well-established result where the expert provides an efficient
treatment if the following three assumptions hold (see Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2006
and 2009): i) consumers are homogenous, ii) consumers are committed to an expert
once the expert makes a recommendation, and iii) the type of treatment provided and
the diagnostic effort are verifiable. The key to this result is that, at the equilibrium,
the expert charges the same markup for all possible treatments, removing any incentive
to provide an inefficient treatment. The expert then has the right incentive to acquire
information on the efficient treatment. In the present paper we extend this framework
by considering risk-averse consumers, and show that the efficiency result may not hold.
Our result is driven by the tension between the equal mark-up pricing and the risk borne
by the consumers under this type of tariff. Even if it is known in principal-agent games
that the optimal contract is second best when the agent is risk averse, we show that the
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mechanism by which risk aversion leads to inefficiency is somewhat different in a basic
model of credence goods.
The model is presented in the next section. We then analyze the expert’s equilibrium
strategy (Section 3) and its consequences for efficiency (Section 4).
2 The model
We use a standard expert model of credence goods similar to Dulleck and Kerschbamer
(2006). We assume a continuum of identical consumers with a total mass of 1. Each
consumer has a problem which can be major or minor. Two treatments are available: a
minor treatment can only solve a minor problem while a major treatment can solve both
types of problem. The parameter v is the gross gain of a consumer when his problem
is solved, otherwise he gets 0. The consumer knows that he has a problem but he does
not know the type. Ex-ante, each consumer expects that his problem is major with a
probability h and minor with a probability (1− h). The consumers are supposed to be
risk averse. Their utility follows a Von Neumann-Morgenstern form u(x) with u(0) = 0,
x being the consumer’s net gain.
An expert can detect the true type of the problem only by conducting a proper di-
agnosis. Without diagnosis, the expert can not supply an appropriate treatment and
can only choose to always supply a minor treatment (undertreatment) or a major one
(overtreatment). The cost of a major treatment is c, and the cost of a minor treatment is
c, with c > c. If a diagnosis is performed, the expert bears a cost d that is charged to the
consumers. We assume that the type of treatment provided by the expert is verifiable.
In the first period of the game, the expert posts prices p and p respectively for a major
and a minor treatment, and commits to conducting a diagnosis or not. Consumers observe
these actions and decide whether to visit the expert or not (second period). In the third
period, nature determines the type of the consumer’s problem (major or minor). In the
fourth period, the expert conducts a diagnosis or not, recommends a treatment, charges
for it and provides it. The action of making a diagnosis is observed by the client1 but the
1Unlike Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009), we do not consider here the case of unobservable diagnosis
effort.
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result of this diagnosis is not.
3 The expert’s price-setting strategy
First, consider prices
(
p, p
)
that ensure equal markup for the expert for both treatments(
p− c = p− c
)
. If the expert performs a diagnosis, he is induced to provide the right
treatment, so that the consumer’s expected utility is equal to hu(v−p−d)+(1− h) u(v−
(p−c+c)−d). The expert chooses prices that drive the consumer’s expected utility down
to 0. The consumer incurs a risk premium δ ∈ (0, (1− h) (c− c)] which is such that:
u(v−p−d+(1− h) (c− c)− δ) = h u(v−p−d)+(1− h) u(v− (p− c+ c)−d) = 0 (1)
Therefore, the expert posts prices satisfying:
p = v − d+ (1− h) (c− c)− δ and p = p− c+ c (2)
The expert could decide instead to post prices
(
p, p
)
that induce him to always provide
the major treatment (i.e. p − c > p − c). No diagnosis is then required and the prices
posted are:
p = v and p < p− c+ c (3)
The consumers’ risk aversion plays no role here.
Finally, the expert could also post prices
(
p, p
)
that always lead to a minor treatment
(i.e. p−c < p−c). The consumer does not pay any cost for diagnosis but bears the risk of
an insufficient treatment. As a consequence there exists a risk premium γ ∈ (0, (1− h) v]
such that:
u((1− h)v − p− γ) = h u(−p) + (1− h) u(v − p) = 0 (4)
and the expert posts prices satisfying:
p = (1− h)v − γ and p < p− c+ c (5)
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the result of the comparison of previous
profits.
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Lemma 1 The equilibrium prices
(
p, p
)
satisfy:
(1) p− c = p− c with p = v − d+ (1− h) (c− c)− δ, for d ≤Min
{
(1− h) (c− c) ,
h(v − (c− c)) + γ
}
− δ
(2) p− c > p− c with p = v, for d ≥ (1− h) (c− c)− δ and v ≥
c− c− γ
h
,
(3) p− c < p− c with p = (1− h)v − γ, for d ≥ h(v − (c− c)) + γ − δ and v ≤
c− c− γ
h
.
In case 1, the expert conducts the diagnosis and proposes the appropriate treatment. In
cases 2 and 3, the expert does not conduct a diagnosis and proposes either overtreatment
(case 2) or undertreatment (case 3). Solid lines in Figure 1 delineate these 3 different
cases.
This lemma shows that the consumers’ risk aversion, captured by positive risk-premia
δ and γ, clearly induces the expert to bias his pricing strategy towards full insurance of
the consumer i.e. overtreatment. In the presence of risk aversion, the expert is thus more
inclined than in the risk neutral case not to invest in diagnosis.
4 Efficiency analysis
We now determine whether risk aversion leads the expert to bias his behavior with respect
to the case where the diagnostic outcome is observed. For that purpose, we first derive
the efficient solution, i.e. the equilibrium under symmetric information on the diagnostic
outcome.
If the expert wants to follow an overtreatment strategy, his profit does not depend on
the information available so he does not need to conduct a diagnosis. If we denote by piO∗
the expert’s profit under symmetric information with overtreatment (O) and by piO the
expert’s profit under asymmetric information with overtreatment, we have piO∗ = piO ≡
v − c. In the same way, undertreatment (U) does not require diagnosis so that using a
similar notation we have piU∗ = piU ≡ (1− h)v − γ − c.
Suppose now that the expert makes a diagnosis and provides the appropriate treatment
(AT ). His profit under symmetric information is thus given by piAT∗ ≡ h(p − c) + (1 −
5
h)(p− c), which is maximized for p = p = v − d, and his profit is given by:
piAT∗ ≡ v − d− c− h(c− c) (6)
So an expert who provides an appropriate treatment earns a higher profit than under
asymmetric information since: piAT∗ > piAT ≡ v − d− δ − c− h (c− c).
The following Lemma presents the equilibrium under symmetric information, and
Proposition 1 concludes on the efficiency of the equilibrium stated by Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 The efficient solution is such that:
(a) the expert sets a price p if the major treatment is diagnosed and a price p if the mi-
nor treatment is diagnosed with p = p = v−d, for d ≤Min {(1− h) (c− c) , h(v − (c− c)) + γ},
(b) the expert does not undertake diagnosis and sets a price p = v for the major
treatment only for d ≥ (1− h) (c− c) and for v ≥ c−c−γ
h
,
(c) the expert does not undertake diagnosis and sets a price p = (1 − h)v − γ for the
minor treatment only for d ≥ h(v − (c− c)) + γ and v ≤ c−c−γ
h
.
Based on Lemmata 1 and 2, we have the following implication:
Proposition 1 With risk-averse consumers, the expert strategy leads to an inefficient
equilibrium for the intermediary level of the diagnostic cost:
d ∈
[
Min
{
(1− h) (c− c) ,
h(v − (c− c)) + γ
}
− δ,Min
{
(1− h) (c− c) ,
h(v − (c− c)) + γ
}]
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1. In both areas A and B, the expert inefficiently does
not conduct a diagnosis under asymmetric information2.
Let us explain these two inefficient areas. With symmetric information on the diag-
nostic outcome, if the expert undertakes the diagnosis, he chooses the same price for both
treatments and then provides the appropriate treatment. The information symmetry on
the diagnostic outcome allows the combination of a risk-free tariff and the completion of
2Our results are consistent with Proposition 1 of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) and Lemma 1 of
(2009): for risk-neutral consumers (γ = δ = 0), the market leads to the efficient outcome.
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the appropriate treatment. With asymmetric information, in order to induce a truthful
disclosure of the diagnosis result, the expert is constrained to differentiate the price accord-
ing to the treatment proposed. In other words, full insurance and information disclosure
are no longer compatible. Thus, under symmetric information, the full insurance allows
the expert to capture the risk premium while under asymmetric information the expert
is constrained to leave that risk premium to the consumer. If the expert provides instead
an overtreatment, there is no risk since the consumer always pays for the treatment and
the diagnostic cost is saved. This choice is inefficient as long as the diagnostic cost is
not too high but could be preferred by the expert that is no longer constrained to leave
the risk premium to the consumer. The expert could also save the diagnostic cost and
choose the undertreatment. As above, information asymmetry increases the risk incurred
under appropriate treatment and thus biases the expert choice between undertreatment
and appropriate treatment, towards undertreatment.
The usual efficiency result resurfaces when undertreatment is prohibited by a liability
clause. With a liability clause undertreatment is de facto prohibited. Hence, the expert
provides an appropriate treatment for any price such that p − c ≥ p − c. This crucial
effect of liability on efficiency is consistent with the recent experimental study of Dulleck
et al. (2011). These experiments show that, contrary to the predictions of the theoretical
literature, verifiability of the treatment provided alone has no significant impact on the
degree of efficiency, whereas the addition of liability has a highly significantly positive
impact on the degree of efficiency.
Our results also hold under Bertrand competition. The intuition is basically the same.
The appropriate treatment requires equal mark-up but the introduction of competition
drives the mark-up down to zero. To fully ensure the consumers, an expert could be
induced to deviate from that equilibrium by providing overtreatment at a higher price
because of the risk premium. Nevertheless, since the equilibrium prices with competi-
tion are lower than under monopoly, the risk premium δ changes. When the consumer
is characterized by a decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA) utility function (respec-
tively IARA), the risk premium is lower (respectively higher) and the deviation is less
(respectively more) likely to be profitable.
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5 Conclusion
In a credence good market, information disclosure may require that all treatments be
sold at the same profit margin. With risk-averse consumers, such equal margin tariffs
generate a risk premium that may drive the expert to abstain from diagnosis and supply
an inefficient treatment. We show that a liability clause fixes this inefficient behaviour.
Insurance on consumers’ final income may also increase the expert’s incentives to provide
an appropriate treatment, by reducing the individual risk premium3. Finally, our result
opens the discussion on experts’ behaviors when customers differ in their level of risk
aversion4. Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) show that consumers’ heterogeneity in their
probability of needing different treatments triggers inefficient rationing or discrimination.
Are same behaviors observed when consumers differ in their level of risk aversion?
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Figure 1: Expert’s choice and its efficiency impact
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